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Abstract  
The hypothesis is that Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency have an aspect of sustainability in relation 
to inequality. Such efficient situations reached increasing inequality are argued to bring in the long term 
decreases of effective demand larger than counterbalances by total factor productivity growth. Equity and 
efficiency in welfare economics, rather than being quite contrasting objectives, are as such related and 
mutually necessary. Countries implementing redistributive policies could implement Kaldor-Hicks 
movements which make some parts of the economic agents less well off. Such movements with redistribution 
would though reinstate effective demand on the demand side and make in general all economic agents better 
off, increasing output and wealth throughout the economy. Redistributive policies increase also imports, 
benefiting other countries and remunerating therefore their potential free-rider behaviour. The concerned 
demand side policies, requiring cooperation and redistribution, call the international institutions to coordinate 
their action for harmonizing such policies and restrain free-rider behaviour.  
Keywords: paradigm, inequality, total factor productivity growth, confounding, pareto efficiency, 
kaldor-hicks efficiency, cost-benefit analysis, effective demand, sustainability, sustainable development, 
global economy.  
Introduction  
In Benazzo (2009), a paradigm is presented in which competition for meritocracy is good for TFP 
growth and cooperation for keeping inequality as low as possible is good for the outlet markets. In this paper 
the implication of that paradigm are drawn on the domain of Pareto Efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 
In order to proceed it is therefore necessary to recall the main aspects of the paradigm. This is done in 
Benazzo (2010) and a shorter version is here performed. The wealth maximisation condition of this paradigm 
is that, given a situation in which the economy is at full potential output, TFP growth is maximised while its 
benefices are equally shared by both capital and labour, and throughout all occupational groups, in order to 
avoid excessive inequality. Considering the analysis of Paolo Sylos Labini (1981), capital remuneration and 
labour remuneration should keep growing at the same yearly percentage as that of TFP growth. It is 
underlined that this condition should apply also throughout wages of all occupational groups, in order to 
have an impact on inequality aspects. This condition has been unattended in the last decades, such that 
capital remuneration and top executives remuneration have grown more that TFP growth, while other 
occupational groups remuneration have grown less than TFP growth or have ended even more behind 
(Krugman, 2007). Different empirical analysis brings to different and contrasting results on a correlation of 
inequality with effective demand and with growth (Galbraith, 2008; Barro, 2008). This is argued to be due to 
three main sources of confounding. Altogether these sources of confounding require to be controlled in order 
to avoid that a variable, i.e. called inequality, hiddenly includes other dynamics becoming as such a 
composed confounding variable with a spurious name. The three sources of confounding are considered to 
hide a negative correlation between inequality and effective demand.  
Inequality and Effective Demand  
Concerning the first, inequality has a different effect on the subsistence sector that concerns 
subsistence necessities and on the modern industrial sector that concerns goods and services that can 
eventually be foregone. This latter sector includes all the rest, such as leisure food, leisure clothes, additional 
housing, appliances, holidays, recreation, etc. “Industrial” in the sense that was absent in traditional 
subsistence economies, “modern” as industrialization touches also the traditional subsistence sector 
production, which remains “traditional”. This is a dual sectors economy based on the research by Arthur W. 
Lewis, which was on the supply side, and it is transformed in two sectors that can be considered from the 
demand side also. The dual economy of Bhaduri (2006) includes also the analysis of the demand side, using 
a classification of the two sectors more in line with that of Lewis. Amartya Sen’s (1981) analysis of famines, 
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those due to increase in inequality, is applied to the two sectors economy. This brings to the implication that 
a rise in inequality creates a dynamic of inflation of the subsistence sector in relation to the modern industrial 
sector, within the economy. Subsistence is assumed to be the same in general for all, and to vary for factors 
which are quite independent from a person’s efforts or skills, such as the climate of the area (mountain, 
desert, ...), the metabolism of the person concerning food and reaction to cold or hot temperature. Inequality 
should therefore be measured on the modern industrial sector only because inequality has anyway to be 
ensured, and because subsistence can be assumed an equality consumption in itself. A second source of 
confounding concerns the presence of action on effective demand both from the part of TFP growth and from 
the part of an increase in inequality in opposite directions. This requires the control of one of the two while 
analysing the effect of the other on effective demand. As TFP growth increases effective demand 
counterbalancing decrease in effective demand related to increase in inequalities, when the two are 
considered together without distinguishing them, a moderate progression of effective demand may be 
attributed all to moderate TFP growth rather than to a high TFP growth counterbalanced by a negative effect 
of increased inequality. A stability of effective demand may be attributed to a moderate progression of TFP 
growth counterbalanced by a small effect of increase in inequality or by other factors, while it could instead 
be due to a high TFP growth with a corresponding counterbalance due to inequality increase. The two 
components would need to be considered explicitly, either together, or one only while controlling for the 
other. A third source of confounding dramatizes this dynamic through delocalization that creates a 
decoupling with the demand side that remains locally in the headquarters country, while big part of the 
supply side is delocalised. The TFP growth that operate in the delocalised factories is then embedded in the 
low prices of the delocalised products that are imported in the headquarters country. The TFP growth gets 
therefore delocalised while the inequality increase remains local. Current GDP and GNP measures are 
unsuitable to account specifically for this dynamic. The dynamic tends therefore to remain hidden behind 
data. This should be taken into account, as well as the fact that delocalization tend to give the fruits of TFP 
growth to the parent headquarters in the developed country, leaving the developing country as if TFP growth 
remained as before. Developed as well as developing countries can both have the closed economy inequality 
increase and the delocalization dynamics, even if the second is usually in a larger amount for developed 
economies towards developing ones.  
When the dynamic of increasing inequalities continues, the modern industrial sector would continue to 
shrink in the economy and the TFP growth should then reinstate effective demand on a progressively 
shrinking set of entitlements available in the modern industrial sector. This requires a sustained acceleration 
of the TFP growth which is impossible in the long term.  
The economy would initially appear to remain at a rather constant output or to increase it, while the 
industrial sector would actually be shrinking. When the counterbalancing requires an unfeasible TFP growth, 
the economy would go in recession.  
This paradigm has interesting properties that provide its credibility. There are two main ones: On one 
side it proposes a solution to a controversy over the Keynesian multiplier. Economists’ debates have quite an 
agreement that it works in cases of big recessions or great depressions, in agreement with quite consistent 
empirical findings. The reason why it would work in these occasions is less agreed. Critics tend to consider 
that in such cases it is good to start with Keynesian expenditure and then implement other policies that take 
over when the Keynesian expenditure starts loosing effect due to inflationary dynamics. Advocates tend to 
consider that effective demand and the demand side is important and this is where Keynesian expenditures 
acts. The disagreement rests more on its working during normal fluctuating cycle where findings are quite 
contradictory and leave the debate more open. Critics sustain that it works only in the short term and then 
that it loses thrusts as it drained by inflationary pressures. Advocates consider that it works on effective 
demand and that it makes these measures work. The paradigm of inequality decrease multiplier provides a 
reconciling reason for this. It indicates that in big recessions or great depressions the economic situation is so 
compromised that Keynesian expenditure in any case would decrease inequalities. In case instead of mild 
negative economic cycle, Keynesian expenditure can be carried out in two ways, either by increasing public 
sector expenditure in a bigger amount than the increase in taxes, or by decreasing the public sector in a 
smaller amount than the decrease in taxes. The first way therefore decreases inequalities, the second one 
increases them. Keynesian economics fosters considering them as equivalent. The inequality decrease 
multiplier entails rather that the Keynesian expenditure performed decreasing inequality is the one that 
works. The inequality decrease multiplier entails that the Keynesian multiplier works when it decreases 
inequalities, and that as such is a special case of the inequality decrease multiplier. It allows agreeing with 
both critics and advocates of Keynesian expenditure on the condition of specifying the type of Keynesian 
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expenditure.  
The other interesting property of the inequality decrease multiplier is that it provides a solution to the 
paradox of thrift. The decrease in the aggregate value of savings due to an increase in savings, is a normal 
case when inequality increases, as it increases the propensity to save while it decreases effective demand on 
the demand side, in the long run at a faster pace that what TFP growth can counterbalance. This creates 
financial market bubbles that burst and eventually pass to other sectors of the economy ending up in 
subsistence sectors of the economy, like housing. From there the only way out left is through recession, 
which decreases the value of savings. This dynamic, rather than a paradox, is a normal case dynamic.  
Social sustainability and Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency  
Upon this base, the relation of inequality with efficiency is examined.  
These are considered as separated in conventional economics. Economics equity is one issue and 
efficiency another. The maximisation of output is disconnected from equity. The analysis performed here 
above brings to the implication that, inequality affects output maximisation. Inequality decreases effective 
demand on the demand side and as such has a contrasting effect on TFP growth. Inequality may affect also 
TFP growth from the supply side if it is excessive or too low (Caselli, Francesco & Nicola Gennaioli, 2005). 
If it is too low it may tamper incentives to perform and therefore to find ways to decrease costs by increasing 
TFP growth. If it is too high, it may foster dynastic management that rewards ties and relations rather than 
efficiency.  
Pareto Efficiency is disconnected from equity issues (Zerbe Jr. and Bellas, 2006). As Pareto Efficiency 
allows that efficiency gains from TFP growth are distributed in a way that inequality increases substantially, 
then it may allow TFP growth in the short term, however, through the demand side, it allows inequality 
effects to decrease effective demand and to bring about ‘paradox’ of thrift dynamics, which decrease output 
and the value of the increased savings. This decreases wealth of many, both those that saw their wealth 
increase in the beginning and others that had already remained behind before. The Pareto Efficiency 
criterion, when put in a paradigm with the inequality decrease multiplier, contradicts itself. It states that it 
should avoid decreasing the wealth of others, however in the long run it allows decreasing the wealth of 
many. The Pareto Efficiency criterion is as such unsustainable. It could certainly be compatible with 
situations in which Pareto improvements are carried out with cases in which inequality stays constant or 
decreases. In such cases its sustainability would remain. The Pareto Efficiency criterion though is detached 
from distribution issues. The Pareto Efficiency criterion is meant to define different states which are all 
considered efficient in the same way, when the wealth of some is increased without decreasing that of others. 
The Pareto Efficiency criterion is usually considered as to be supplemented by political decisions. These 
could judge about equity issues. In the inequality decrease multiplier paradigm though, the Pareto Efficiency 
would define as equal Pareto improvements those that have different effects on inequality. This, having 
different effects of the sustainability of the Pareto Optimality, contradicts the impartiality of the Pareto 
Efficiency criterion. There are therefore different states of Pareto Optimality in the long run that give it 
sustainability or unsustainability and in variuos degrees. The criterion is as such of little added value in 
policy options analysis, and in political choices, and it may lead to consider as equivalent options which have 
very different sustainability conditions.  
Pareto Efficiency is anyhow a principle that is almost impossible to have in actual practical economic 
dynamics. As Zerbe Jr. points (2006), also a transaction which is Pareto Efficient for those that are directly 
involved in the transaction may decrease the wealth of the consumers that would have paid less the purchase, 
as this increases at least slightly the price of the purchase in the market, and the decreases the wealth of the 
suppliers that think the purchase should have been at higher prices, as it decreases the price in the market.  
The alternative Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency criterion, allowing for decreasing the wealth of others as long 
as the wealth in the economy increases, can also be analysed in light of the inequality decrease multiplier 
paradigm. The action or project considered is desirable when the money value of benefits is higher than that 
of the costs. This again is disconnected from issues of distribution. Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency is the standard 
criterion (KH) used in Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA). Principal aims of BCA are to save money, maximise 
wealth and increase aggregate real income. In the inequality decrease multiplier these aims require tackling 
inequality; therefore the KH criterion would be insufficient. More in specific, as indicated for the Pareto 
Efficiency, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is also indicating a set of valid options that have an equivalent value 
of improving efficiency. As long as in indicating these sets of options the inequality is left out of the picture, 
as in the Pareto Efficiency, the issue of sustainability of the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency improvements is left 
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out. A state A is considered, from which there are two possible improvements, both having benefits higher 
than costs after the losers are potentially compensated for any loss incurred. These two states are state B and 
C, and in relation to each other they run into the Scitovscky paradox as they can be reversed one back to the 
other indefinitely and still respect the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency. States B and C, which are then equivalent in 
such a frame, are most likely having different effects on inequality. This leaves thus disregarded the issue of 
their sustainability in an inequality decrease multiplier paradigm. The value of equivalence of the two states 
B and C is in such a paradigm lost and the two policy options on one side cannot be considered equivalent, 
on the other side there is no information that indicates what distributional effects each of the two carry out. 
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion lacks therefore added value for setting priorities and policy options comparisons 
in an inequality decrease multiplier paradigm.  
Zerbe Jr. (2006) indicates a different view which has been called Kaldor-Hicks-Moral (KHM), which 
addresses the problem of moral sentiments in the Benefit-Cost Analysis. In the moral sentiments, the 
sentiments about equity are included. Equity issues are therefore included, and as such this criterion 
addresses the issue of inequalities. The willingness to pay (WTP) are measured also for outcomes of projects 
and policy options that touch moral sentiments. These measurements are quite more difficult. Moral values 
in Benefit-Cost Analysis have often been integrated by KH as an adjustment of the discount rate, which 
usually is decreased with respect to the current one in the markets, in order to account more for long term 
effects. This addresses somehow the issue of sustainability. Specific information about directions in 
inequality remains though hidden in such information and therefore the sustainability in relation to increases 
in inequality remain out of the picture. The KHM, including the WTP for the moral sentiments towards 
equity, addresses this issue (Zerbe Jr., 2004).  
The KHM characteristics, in comparison to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion are (Zerbe Jr., 2006 ): 1) both 
use willingness to pay for gains and willingness to accept costs of losses; 2) both acknowledge the existing 
property rights as a status quo; 3) KH considers equally all gains or losses, while KHM excludes those that 
are legally illegitimate or that violate well-accepted moral principles; 4) both recognize and include also non-
pecuniary effects; 5) KH uses the Potential Compensation Test for identifying the efficient options, while 
KHM uses the comparison of aggregate benefits with aggregate losses; 6) KM, even if there are willingness 
to pay for options components related to moral sentiments, it excludes them, while KHM includes all those 
for which there are WTP; 7) both assume equal marginal utility of income, treating each person the same; 8) 
KM justifies its use on the presence of market failures and externalities, while KHM works without this 
condition; 9) KH excluded transaction costs, while KHM includes them; 10) KM tends to be considered as 
the answer, rather than information on options within a wider decision making process, while KHM uses this 
second approach.  
A relevant characteristic in the sustainability issue in relation to equity analysed here, both for KH and 
for KHM is the number (5). It has been analysed already for KH above. Concerning KHM, the comparison 
of aggregate benefits with aggregate losses overlooks the effects on distribution. Effects on distribution are 
included in the costs and benefits as moral sentiments, such as those against generating income losses for the 
poor (Zerbe Jr. 2006). This is positive and towards considering more inequality. This approach leaves though 
efficiency and equity as two separate issues which lack any feedback with each other. Welfare increase is the 
result of benefits net of losses to be still positive, including also equity in the counting. The inequality 
decrease multiplier implicates a trade-off between TFP growth for competition and inequality decrease for 
cooperation. Being equity one of the components of the Benefit-Costs, in terms of WTP for satisfying moral 
sentiments, there is the issue of putting a weight to the equity issues. Should it weight as any other 
component, other moral sentiments, and other increases in personal wealth? The inequality decrease 
multiplier gives a special importance to inequality which can be detached from moral sentiments. Inequality 
is in fact in such a paradigm a self interest, as it ensures sustainability of a wealth situation reached. With 
inequality increase, the ‘paradox’ of thrift dynamic in the long term counteracts the wealth situation reached 
and brings to a lower welfare situation. A selfish person is therefore interested in a decrease in inequality 
sufficient to maintain the welfare situation. The problem is then how can that person obtain such a result. 
The ‘free-rider’ dynamic is in place here, for which a selfish would want that everybody else pays for 
decreasing inequality but him/herself. The choice of social sustainability by decreasing inequality confirms 
to be in the sphere of cooperation. There is the need of a social contract for this; laws that indicate how 
certain labour market dynamics before taxes should function or how taxes should be in order to decrease 
excessive inequality.  
Another issue raised by the inequality decrease multiplier paradigm is the characteristic number (7). 
Both KH and KHM assume equal marginal utility of income, treating each person the same.  
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In the inequality decrease multiplier, the marginal utility of consumption is different for different 
levels of wealth. Marginal utility of consumption is equivalent to marginal utility of wealth. An affluent 
person has a lower marginal utility of wealth than a limitedly wealthy person. Wealth is related to income. 
Condition (7) is therefore incompatible with the inequality decrease multiplier as it impedes to consider 
distribution issues. Again, KHM addresses partially this by including equity in the moral sentiments for 
which there is willingness to pay.  
The implications in an inequality decrease multiplier are that Benefit-Cost analysis misses its central 
aims. It is required to provide a clear criterion for deciding between two options which one is better for 
saving money, maximise wealth and increase the aggregate real income. Without including inequality in the 
picture, these two options may be equal for the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, while having different inequality 
implications. They would in the long run bring to very different states of those aims. An option superior in 
Benefit-Cost Analysis based on KH could be inferior when considering for the inequality implications. The 
challenge for Benefit-Cost Analysis is therefore to see if there are ways to develop even further the 
inequality issue, from the work done for the KHM criterion, and to see if it is possible to pass it from the 
moral sentiments spheres to a sphere which touches long term self interest about the sustainability of the 
Efficiency inherent in the Optimality reached. This sustainability remains currently an issue which requires 
deep implication of social choices, as it entails a free-rider incentive that has to be regulated by political 
decisions. The KH criterion could still be used currently in a way as to consider two equal options in terms of 
KH and add to them separately the consideration of the implications on inequality of the two options.  
The implication of the differentiation between short term efficiency, on one side, and long term 
sustainable efficiency, on the other, leads to the necessity of a change in the economic policies on the global 
arena. As the global economic crisis affects all countries, global competitive export-led policies are deemed 
to disappoint as they need to have at least a corresponding quantity of import demand from import-led 
countries. The solution is rather on redistribution that would reinstate and enhance internal demand. 
Countries implementing such redistributive policies could implement Kaldor-Hicks movements which make 
some parts of the economic agents less well off. Such movements with redistribution would though reinstate 
effective demand on the demand side and make in general all economic agents better off, increasing output 
and wealth throughout the economy. Such redistributive policies increase also imports, benefiting other 
countries and remunerating therefore their potential free-rider behaviour. The concerned demand side 
policies, requiring cooperation and redistribution, call the international institutions to coordinate their action 
with a new “Bretton Woods” to harmonize such policies that would otherwise be contrasted by the free-rider 
behaviour.  
Concluding Remarks  
The hypothesis presented was that Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency have an aspect of social 
sustainability in relation to inequality, so that only Efficiency equilibria that comply with certain equity 
criteria are sustainable in the long term.  
This analysis has been based on a previous one on different levels of sources of confounding in the 
sense of aggregations that keep together aspects of the same variables that economically generate with 
contrasting dynamics. Their analysis exposes a correlation of inequality with effective demand and with 
growth. As inequality increases, effective demand decreases on the demand side, while total factor 
productivity growth decreases prices reinstating that effective demand. On the long run though this requires 
an unachievable acceleration of total factor productivity growth eventually bringing the economy to a 
recession, or great recession as currently experienced in the world economy, and eventually a great 
depression. This process decreases the welfare of many people contradicting previously reached Pareto or 
Kaldor-Hicks Optimality. The last decades of deregulated free-market policies have coincided with the 
increasing concentration of wealth, increasing inequality. This stem as having brought decreases of effective 
demand larger than counterbalances obtained thanks to total factor productivity growth, majour factor of 
Kaldor-Hicks increases in efficiency. Companies profits, employees’ wages, stock market valuations, have 
therefore come to a plunge in a vicious cycle. The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency unequally allocated yield in the 
long term to aggregate self dismantling. There are sustainable and unsustainable Pareto optimalities, 
sustainable and unsustainable Kaldor-Hicks efficiencies, depending on how each of them affects distribution. 
The challenge is to see how the Kaldor-Hicks, and its development in Kaldor-Hicks-Moral criterion can 
further be developed in order to include inequality issues, in a way as to be counted as self interest factors for 
long term sustainability of wealth in welfare economics. The inclusion of inequality and the need to decrease 
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its excessive levels reached call for a coordination of international organizations on the global arena for a 
new “Bretton Woods” centred though on decreasing inequalities.  
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